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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the effects of social network on income and employment dynamics of 
rural-urban migrants in Vietnam. Estimation of a causal effect is challenging because 
unobserved factors affects both employment performances and social networks. I address this 
endogeneity problem by using instrumental variable method. The results suggest that social 
networks improve migrant’s earnings and make wage earners willing to change their jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Social networks are considered an important informal mechanism through which information 
about job opportunities is transmitted. By solving information and commitment problems in 
environments where markets are inefficient, social networks bridge the informational gap 
between the worker and the firm by providing information on both sides, therefore reducing 
uncertainty and improving the match (Munshi, 2011). Social networks even are much more 
important to migrants from rural to urban regions who found difficult to adapt with new 
environment. Because developing economies are associated with poorly functioning markets, 
networks through relatives, friends and acquaintances, are particularly important for migrants, 
since they typically lack information about the host local labour market and about the 
characteristics of the jobs offered.  Therefore, it is not surprising that much of the empirical 
literature on social networks has been situated in these economies.  
 
The significant role of social contacts in obtaining employment has long been recognized. 
However, what less well understood are the possible effects on subsequent wages or the 
decision of workers to change their employment position of using such networks. While 
positive wage effects from using social networks are sometimes found, this is far from 
universal and has led to consideration being given as to why using social networks may 
appear to lower wages (Delattre & Sabatier, 2007). One explanation is due to training costs 
(Pellizzari, 2010). Firms may want to spend extra effort in using formal means of filling posts 
(for example, advertising or using recruitment agencies), rather than informal means (relying 
on referrals from incumbent workers for hiring new workers). It happens more common 
where the costs of the posts remaining unfilled are high, perhaps due to high training costs 
and consequent high wages. A second explanation bases on the argument of job seeker 
impatience. Those keen to find employment quickly may use job contacts, sacrificing 
potentially higher wages from better matched posts for quicker entry into work (Bentolila et 
al., 2010). Given the ambiguous theoretical predictions about the impact of using job contacts 
on subsequent wages, it is worthwhile to test the hypothesis empirically. 
 
In addition, empirical analyses on the effects of social networks have been plagued by various 
conceptual and data problems. Many commonly used datasets lack information on the 
structure and composition of individuals of social networks. Analyses are further complicated 
by various endogeneity issues such as the refection problem and selection bias. A refection 
problem arises when individual and network members’ outcomes are determined 
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simultaneously, which inherently confounds the measure of networks’ influence. Selection 
bias leads to a correlated unobservable problem if people tend to associate with others based 
in part on some unobserved group characteristics they favor. In such a case, an observed 
positive association between an individual’s outcome and those of their associated network 
members may not be causal but rather due to some unknown factors that affect both social 
links and individual’s own labor market outcomes (see Munshi, 2011 for a review). 
 
The literature seeks to control for a number of individual characteristics and economic 
conditions that could be correlated. However, the obvious concern is that unobserved 
variables remain unaccounted for. Observed individual characteristics such as age, education, 
and occupational experience may not capture traits such as initiative and diligence that play a 
critical role in determining the individual’s market outcomes. Empirical studies on migrant 
networks in the labor market, for example, use the number of friends or relatives in cities to 
measure the strength of the individual’s network. If individuals with greater ability at the 
destination have a greater propensity to migrate, then social groups with higher ability will 
have larger migration rates. The number of friends and relatives in the city could then be 
contaminated by the migrant’s unobserved ability, giving rise to a spurious network effect. 
Using received help or the extent of social interaction to measure the network suffers from 
potential selectivity bias as well, since we would expect more able individuals to receive more 
help and to be better connected in equilibrium. Using fixed effects will fully capture constant 
individual characteristics but will fail to account for unobserved factors that vary over time. 
 
This study seeks to improve our knowledge about the relationship between social networks 
and income dynamics and decision to change the job position of rural to urban migrants 
within a developing country through the use of a novel source of internal migration data. The 
focus on Vietnam is relevant due to the fact that as in many other developing countries, its 
institutional environment is full of uncertainty and frictions, and hence relying informal 
information to get a better job could be a  more effective way than using formal channels. 
From my knowledge, this paper could be one of the first studies investigating the importance 
of social network in shaping migrants’ earning dynamics. 
 
To explore the research questions, I take a question asking about the number of urban callings 
that migrant made during the Lunar New Year as the proxy for social network. The analysis is 
carried out using linear regression models. I find that people who have more urban callings 
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seem to get better paid job. In addition, wage-earners with more social network exhibit their 
willingness to change their employment to run their own business. 
 
Several threats to causality might affect the correlation between social networks and 
outcomes. Omitted individual or destination factors would bias the estimates. In addition, the 
suspected causal relationship between wages and migrant networks can be mutual, leading to 
simultaneity problem. In order to address potential endogeneity, I use the historical weather 
variation as an instrument for social networks. The inherent characteristics of weather 
variation at the departure of migrants provide a basis for the instrument’s exogeneity. Weather 
variation at rural regions would decrease the expected agricultural output of the households 
exposed to  it,  and  thereby  encourage  members  of  these  households  to  migrate to 
cities. Therefore, it is unlikely that weather variation could impact on migrant’s income at 
the destination, other than through the social network. 
 
The results from the instrumental variable (IV) approach suggest that the social network helps 
to improve labour incomes and make migrants be willing to change their job. To confirm the 
findings from IV approach, I carry out some sensitivity tests on the validity of instrumental 
variable. To address the concern of whether the exclusion restriction is satisfied, I perform a 
number of falsification tests that examine the reduced-form relationship between weather 
variation and incomes. The results show that I still find that social networks estimated by the 
IV approach have positive effects on income dynamics. 
  
I begin, in Section 2, by reviewing literature on the impact of social networks on incomes. 
Section 3 then documents the data used. The identification strategy employed is discussed in 
detail in section 4. Section 4 also reports OLS estimates of the relationship between social 
networks and dynamics of income and employment. I then turn to the issues of causality OLS 
estimates that control for an extensive set of observable characteristics, as well as the IV 
estimates. Section 5 offers concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There are a numerous studies on the relationship between the social networks and labor 
market outcomes (see Jackson (2010) for a comprehensive survey). Theoretical works have 
highlighted the role of the social ties in transmitting information on vacancies to unemployed 
individuals and in producing job referrals to the employers. For example, Granovetter (1995) 
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argues that many people find their jobs through social relations, not only through formal 
channels. Social networks allow people looking for work to gather better information about 
the availability of jobs as well as the characteristics of the job.  
 
However, there are no common agreements on the possible effects on subsequent wages. 
While Granovetter confirms the positive effects of social networks on incomes and the 
appropriateness of the work is found through the relationship, other studies have not found the 
differences in incomes between those who seek their job in the formal channels and others 
through social networks (such as Lin, 1999; Mouwn, 2003; Franzen & Hangartner, 2006). In 
addition, one of the principal challenges for the empirical analysis is that the network is not 
observed. Therefore, literature seeks to approximate the social network by using information 
on groups which are known to be socially cohesive and clustered in areas (e.g., ethnic 
minority groups). As a consequence, regression models are used to correlate labour market 
outcomes with a proxy for the social network which is capable of capturing geographical or 
ethnic proximity of individuals rather than networks (Topa, 2001; Clark & Drinkwater, 2002; 
Munshi, 2003, Bayer, Ross & Topa, 2008, Patacchini & Zenou, 2008).  
 
There are very few studies that use direct measures of the network. Cappellari & Tatsiramos 
(2010) draw information on the employment status of the best friends using the British 
Household Panel Survey. They find that transitions from unemployment into employment are 
positively correlated with the number of employed friends. Calvò-Armengol, Patacchini & 
Zenou (2009) create a network variable based on schoolmates using the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Adolescent Health. They find that the position in the network is strongly correlated 
with students’ performance. Wahba & Zenou (2005), who use density of population to 
capture size of networks in Egyptian, show that density is positively correlated with the 
probability of finding a job through the social networks. This is however happening up to a 
certain threshold, beyond which congestion effects exist and hence individuals in particularly 
dense areas are less likely to find a job through the social networks. Another study by Goel 
and Lang (2010) using data on recent arrivals to Canada find that the impact of obtaining jobs 
through the social networks on wages is decreasing on their measure of network strength.   
 
In this paper, I follow Giulietti et al. (2010) to use direct measure of social network, which is 
self-reported of migrants on the number of greetings that they make during the Lunar New 
Year to urban people, to explore the effect of social ties on income dynamics and temptation 
to change jobs. 
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3. Data Sources and Description 
 
Data is taken from the Vietnam Rural Urban Migration Survey (VRUMS) in 2013. The 
VRUMS is conducted by the Central Institute for Economic Management of the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, Vietnam under the technical support from Research School of 
Economics at the Australian National University. The objective of VRUMS is to gather 
sample information on rural-urban migration in Vietnam anchoring to 2012 Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS2012). The survey intends to help estimating the 
effects of large scale rural-urban migration in the process of economic development and to be 
able to assist the government in formulating the right economic and social policies to facilitate 
the rural-urban migration and urbanization process. 
 
This survey collects data and information from 869 migrant households and individuals from 
rural areas of the whole Vietnam to urban areas mainly in Ha Noi and HoChiMinh City and 
surrounding areas for work. Migrant households are defined as a household whether members 
of the migrant worker must have family relationship or relatives, live with the respondent, 
share incomes and expenditures at the time of interview. These households or individuals 
come from the rural household base of Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 
in 2012, whereas VHLSS is national representaive survey undertaken biannually by the 
General Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO).   
 
Because VHLSS2012 used 2009 Population and Housing Census as a sampling frame, we 
expect that VHLSS2012 will be representative of population. In addition, the information on 
rural-urban migration taken from VHLSS2012 rural households will be well representative of 
rural-urban migration in Vietnam. The procedure of survey is implemented as followings: 
Calling the rural households in the VHLSS2012 to see whether they have migrant workers to 
either HaNoi, HoChiMinh City or other surrounding urban areas. If the households/families 
have migrants, ask and get information and contact details of the migrants (including both 
long-term (over 6 months) and short term (6 months and shorter migrants) originating from 
the rural households; get the permissions of rural households for contacting their household 
member migrants in the cities; then calling these migrants or migrant households and making 
appointments for interviews based on a VRUMS2013 standard questionnaire. 
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Due to the complex procedure of survey process, we expect that there are some reasons that 
may make the sample biased. First, there are quite a lot of rural phone numbers that have 
been missing from Vietnam’s Household Living Standard Survey. Second, there are some 
rural households with incorrect numbers. Third, some rural households refused to provide or 
provide wrong phone number of migrants in the cities. Fourth, selected migrants may refuse 
to participate. All of above reasons will affect the quality of survey data and may lead to 
sample biases due to selection problems. For example, we may expect the survey may miss 
out rural poor households who do not have landline or mobile phones. Therefore, our survey 
may be well representative of richer rural households rather than overall migrant population. 
In addition, the individuals who choose not participating may systematically different from 
those who do. These sampling errors may make the final sample be biased. 
 
To check the potentials of sample selection biases, we compared some main characteristics of 
rural households who have household member migrating for work in Hanoi or HoChiMinh 
City but not be appeared in two surveys (VRUMS2013 and VHLSS2012). The detail strategy 
is as followings: 
 
First, we took information and characteristics of both long-term and short-term migrants of 
rural household to HN and HCM small sample of VHLSS2012 (income and expenditure 
survey). In VHLSS2012, there are sections asking information about two types of migrations: 
long-term and short-term migrants. Long-term migrants are defined as former members of 
rural households “who (1) left the household within the last 10 years or (2) may have left at an 
earlier time but household still considers important for your household, in terms of obligations 
to old parents living with your household or financial support to your household”.  We picked 
people who take up work in the Hanoi or HCM within the first 6 months and did not include 
people attending school or being economically inactive. There are 307 migrants who moved 
to work in HN or HCM and took up a job within the first 6 months. 
 
Short-term migrants are regarded as people who are member of rural households and leaving 
the household for “at least 6 month for work since 2002”. The short-term migrant included 
both returned migrants and unreturned migrants who are still working far way. Therefore, 
VHLSS2012 does not cover households who have people who migrate to those cities less than 
6 months. For short-term migrants, we only took people who have not returned to households. 
In total, we have 319 migrants, of which 307 long-term migrants (who used to be rural 
household members) and 12 unreturned short-term migrants (who are currently rural 
household members) who are currently working in HN or HCM.  
 
Second, we then match rural households of these 319 short-term and long-term migrants in 
VHLSS2012 with those of 243 migrants in VRUM2013. We found that only 2 short-term and 
70 long-term migrants in VHLSS2012 coming from the same rural households in 
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VRUMS2013. Therefore, 172 households with migrants in VRUMS2013 have not covered by 
VHLSS2012. In other words, VHLSS2012 may underreport the number of migrants, 
especially who are very short-migrants leaving households for less than 6 months. However, 
at the same time, there are 244 migrants reported in VHLSS2012 but have not been included 
in VRUMS2013. This number of migrants may come from sampling errors as explained 
above. 
 
We then assess whether two groups of rural households who have missing migrants from each 
survey to see whether they are balanced on some observable characteristics. Such information 
would provide tentative evidence how selection biases are. The table below provides balanced 
tests of some main demographic indicators. The first two columns show the simple means of 
two samples in these indicators. The two samples are indifferent in means in most indicators, 
except age which is marginally different. However, the distribution of age in two groups of 
rural households is almost similar
1
. The balanced tests confirmed that although there are 
sampling errors in VRUMS2013, the sample still assures its randomness and 
representativeness. 
 
 
Difference-in-Means by VHLSS2012 and VRUMS2013 
Variables Means  Difference in means 
 
Unmatched 
VHLSS2012 
Unmatched 
VRUMS2013 
 T-
statistics P- value 
Minority  0.08 0.06  0.49 0.62 
Age of HH Head 54.36 52.27  1.74 0.08 
Gender (Male=1) 0.76 0.81  1.18 0.24 
Marital Status of HH Head 
(Married=1) 0.99 0.98 
 
0.99 0.32 
Proportion of HH members under 16 0.05 0.06  0.99 0.32 
Proportion of HH members over 65 0.14 0.12  0.81 0.42 
Years of schooling of HH Head 7.08 7.27  0.53 0.60 
Rural household locations 2.01 2.11  1.21 0.23 
Hour wage rate in the past 30 days of 
HH Head 16.05 17.90 
 
0.95 0.34 
Number of Observations 244 156    
Note: Rural household locations are coded as 1 if in the North, 2 if in the Centre and 3 if the South, respectively. 
Individual information is from rural household heads. The Unmatched VRUMS2013 are rural households who 
have migrants found in VRUMS2013 but those migrants have not been reported in VHLSS2012. The 
Unmatched VHLSS2012 are rural households who report having migrants in VHLSS2012 but those migrants 
have not been found in VRUMS2013. The third column is the T-statistics of means differences of two samples. 
 
The survey covers both the migrants who currently and used to members of rural households 
who are working in these cities. From my knowledge, this is one of the best surveys available 
                                                          
1
We also try to take only rural households who have migrants found in VRUMS2013 but have not been 
reported in VHLSS20112 since 2002 to make two groups more consonant in the definition on rural-urban 
migration. The number of these rural households is 144 and the results are similar. 
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on rural-urban migration in Vietnam in the sense that it captures the most complete range of 
working migrants in the cities: both long-term (over 6 months) and short term (6 months and 
shorter such as temporary migrants and seasonal) migrants that have not been fully taken into 
account in other surveys. 
 
Another novel of the survey is that it includes questions asking about both the current 
incomes and the first job income that allow me to investigate the income dynamics of 
migrants. The surveys also includes comprehensive information on household and personal 
characteristics, detailed health status, employment, training and education of adults and 
children, social networks, family and social relationships, life events, and mental health 
measures of the individuals.  
 
To investigate the social network of migrants, I takes of the number of urban callings that 
migrant made during the Lunar New Year as a proxy for social network. The survey is 
conducted at the household level; however, information about social network is only 
provided by the respondent head of household, and hence only these individuals have been 
selected. The exact wording of the question is as follows: ”During the last Lunar New Year, 
how many people in total did you send your greetings. Among them, ________person(s) is 
(are) currently living in the city”. 
 
To investigate the impact of social network on employment transition, I use information from 
the question asking about migrants who are currently wage earners and reported that they are 
thinking to change their jobs by running their own business. The exact question is: “Have you 
ever thought of running a business of your own?”. Respondents could either answer never 
think about it or they already had. They also had the option of answering that they never think 
about it seriously “because it would be very difficult”. I construct a measure that takes on the 
binary value of 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to the response ‘Never’ and ‘Never seriously’ 
and 1 to the response ‘Yes, I have’. I then use OLS to estimate a linear probability model. 
Another strategy is to estimate a logit model. As I discuss below, the estimates are 
qualitatively identical if I pursue this alternative strategy. 
 
The summary statistics for migrant’s household heads are presented in Table 1. On average, 
migrants have about ten years of education and they have left home more than eight years 
before the survey. The percentage of female is quite small because only household head, 
usually males, are considered in the sample under scrutiny. Current jobs of migrants have 
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been better paid than their first job in the cities. There are more than one-third of current 
wage earners are willing to change their job and run their own business. Regarding the 
network measure, each migrant has on average ten contacts in urban areas.  
 
4. Estimating Equations and Empirical Results 
 
4.1 OLS Estimates 
 
I begin by estimating the relationship between social network and employment dynamics. My 
baseline estimating equation is: 
 
      
iciiiiic ZXnetworkSocialOutcome  
''_ (1) 
 
where i indexes individual, c original community in rural regions. The variable icOutcome  
denotes measures of change income of migrants from first job in the cities and the current job 
of migrant i, originating from commune c in rural regions. It also measures the willingness of 
current wage earners in changing their job. inetworkSocial _  represents the number of 
callings to urban people that migrants make in the Lunar New Year. β is the coefficient of my 
main measures that indicates the relationship between the social network and change in the 
individual’s outcomes. I expect β to be positive and statistically significant. αi measures the 
individual’s ability, which directly determines his outcome in the destination labor market 
ic is an exogenous labor demand shock, which reflects the idea that individual migrants from 
given location could be endowed with specific skills that channel them into particular 
segments of the labor market even when networks are absent. 
 
The vector 
'
i  controls a set of individual-level covariates, which includes the characteristics 
of household head, such as age, age squared, years of education, a gender variable indicator, a 
dummy variable for people who are ethnic minorities and dummies for being employed in 
state or foreign sectors. The vector 
'
i  consists of other variables, such as duration of staying 
in the cities and change in job types.  
 
In addition, the main explanatory variable, inetworkSocial _ , in Equation (1) may have 
similar effects on people coming from the same commune in rural areas. Given the potential 
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for within-group correlation of the residuals, I clustered the standard errors for a potentially 
arbitrary correlation between individuals in the same original commune in rural areas. 
 
Table 2 reports OLS estimates of the impacts of social networks on change in migrant’s 
incomes between the current and first-job incomes.  Of which, the income from the first-job is 
adjusted for inflation because migrants in the city arrived in various points of time. In all 
estimations, standard errors are adjusted for clustering of observations of the same commune. 
In Column 1, I estimate the relationship between the number of urban callings with migrant’s 
earnings. The estimates show that the number of urban callings has a positive impact on 
change in migrant’s incomes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the social network 
positively affects individual’s earnings. At the same time, the coefficient is statistically 
significant. Realizing that there are some outliers, that may drive the results (see Figure 1), in 
Column 2, I exclude migrants with more than 100 callings. The effect of social networks is 
three times higher. The result indicates that on average one more contacts on average is 
associated with nearly one percent increase income changes.  
 
Estimates of other variables are also consonant with the results from other studies and 
expectations. People working in the foreign sector have better change in incomes. While the 
age and age square variables both significantly influence change in wages at the 0.05 
significance level; however, the directions of the two effects are different. This implies a 
diminishing marginal effect of the age.  
 
Columns 3-5 of Table 2 report estimates of Equation (1) with the additional controls included. 
In Column 3, I control for duration of migrants in the cities. Network effects will depend on 
both their size and their vintage, since migrants who have been in the cities longer are more 
established and better social networks. I also add the variables that measure the change in the 
job-types of current and first job of migrants in the cities. I classify the jobs with contract as 
formal ones and code them as 1 and the others as 0. In the two last columns, I control for the 
interaction between the number of callings and different cohorts of duration of staying the 
cities. The results indicate that the number of urban callings bring more benefits to more 
established migrants, especially to ones who stay in the cities less than 3 years and from 5 to 8 
years. Based on the estimates from Column 4, the point estimate for this cohort implies that 
12 
 
one more contact on average is associated with a 0.9 percent increase in income changes, 
which is equal to 10.6 per cent of the sample average for log of migrant’s current incomes.2  
 
OLS estimates examining the relationship between the number of urban callings and wage-
earners’ willingness to run their own business are reported in Table 33. The specification 
reported includes the similar control invariables as in the income equation except I include log 
of current incomes which may affect the job decision of migrants. The estimates indicate a 
positive and significantly statistical relationship between social network and willingness to 
run their own business by current wage earners except the last column. However, the 
coefficient of the number of urban callings in the last column has the same sign and 
magnitude with that in the first column. An increase in standard errors may reflect a loss of 
precision arising from significant attrition of observations when I add more control variables. 
I also check for robustness to alternative estimation methods. Because the responses for 
thoughts in running their own business are restricted in range, they may not be normally 
distributed. To overcome this problem, I use a logit model instead. The results from the logit 
model in Appendix A.1 are qualitatively identical to our OLS estimates. The marginal effects 
are consistent with those estimated by OLS and statistically significant.   
 
4.2 Identifying the Causal Relationship 
 
To consistently estimate an OLS model, the explanatory variable of interest, the network 
size, should be uncorrelated with individual unobserved ability. This assumption, however, 
is very likely to be violated. These unobservable individual factors might be correlated 
with both wages and the network characteristics, leading to biased estimates. The direction 
and magnitude of this bias depend on the partial correlation of the omitted variable with 
the error term. For example, if more productive individuals are more likely to have a larger 
network, then the estimates of β will be upward bias. In addition, the wages and the network 
size may be mutually determined, leading to the simultaneity bias. For example, high wage 
in the cities may assist migrants in expanding their network or people may encourage 
more friends and relatives to migrate that also enlarge their network. Another source of 
endogeneity is related with the timing of the survey. Respondents are typically required to 
give information on characteristics of their network that refer to the time of the survey, but 
                                                          
2The mean of log of migrant’s current income is 8.44. The effect is calculated as 0.9/8.44=0.106 or 10.6 per cent 
of mean. 
3
The main reason to use OLS rather other estimators such as logit is that the coefficients estimated by OLS are 
easier to be interpreted.  
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not to the period when individuals searched or obtained their job. To the extent that size of 
networks is affected by labor market events, the correlation coefficient will be biased. In 
this case, controlling for individual fixed characteristics will not address this type of bias. 
Another problem with equation (1) is related to the measurement error of the network. This 
would affect size of network, and has to do with the imperfect recall and with the reporting 
of rounded numbers of contacts; nevertheless, if anything, measurement error is expected to 
generate downward bias in the estimates.  
 
In this section, I try to assess whether the correlations documented to this point are causal by 
using an instrument for social networks. For the regression of interest, one would need to find 
an instrument which is correlated with network characteristics but have no direct impact on 
wages
4
.
 
Origin characteristics that generate exogenous variation in the size of the migrant 
network, but are uncorrelated with labor demand shocks at the destination, could be valid 
instruments. This paper exploits the intensity of weather variations in the origins of migrants 
as an instrument. Under certain assumptions, the weather variation can be seen as an 
exogenous shock to the size of outflow migrants from the rural regions because the 
occurrence and destructive power of weather in a certain areas are random.  
 
Although there are limited scholarly explorations on the association between migration 
behavior and the environment, the close relationship is intuitive. Weather variation would 
decrease the expected agricultural output of the households exposed  to  it,  and  thereby  
encourage  members  of  these  households  to  migrate. Consequently, being hit by natural 
hazards will trigger the outflow migration from rural regions. In other words, the higher 
the intensity of a natural disaster is, the more rural households are likely to move to urban 
areas.  
 
Natural hazards are common in Vietnam. Rural households in Vietnam are exposed to 
many natural risks that could potentially threaten their livelihoods.  In addition, since the 
majority of households in rural areas rely on agricultural activities, they will experience 
fluctuations in agriculturally derived income from exogenous natural shocks such as 
drought, floods, pest infestation and livestock disease (CIEM, DOE, ILSSA & IPSARD 
2007). Here, I take rainfall variation as a proxy for the riskiness of natural environment. 
Literature indicates that the year-to-year rainfall variations capture the effects of 
hazardous natural environment such as floods, typhoons and storms in Vietnam 
reasonably well. For example, Benson (1997) shows that typhoons are typically 
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associated with heavy rainfall and strong winds. Each typhoon accounts for about 10 to 
15 per cent, and sometimes even more, of annual rainfall and causes flash floods and 
landslides. In addition, heavy rainfall causes rivers to fill and potentially results in 
flooding. Therefore, I expect the more typhoons and storms or natural disaster in general 
one region suffers from, the more rainfall volatility it has. 
 
The data on rainfall variability are obtained from weather stations in 87 districts produced by 
the Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology.
4
 These stations are allocated to capture the best 
variation of weather within regions. For the remaining districts without stations, the weather 
conditions are assumed to be similar to districts sharing the same borders with them but have 
a weather station. The reason for this strategy is that stations are expected to gauge significant 
weather variations in different regions. Therefore, weather data from one station could be 
used to measure neighboring districts with similar conditions.  
 
Monthly rainfall observations (from January to December) were available over 30 years for 
each station from 1975 to 2006. For each month, I calculated the standard deviation over the 
30 years for each station, and obtained the average rainfall deviation of each station over 12 
months to investigate year-to-year rainfall fluctuations.  More specifically, consider rainfall 
variable x, station i, month m and year y, and deﬁne ximy as the value of x in station i in month 
m in year y. For each month m, I compute the standard deviation of ximy over all years 
(denoted sim), which measures the month-speciﬁc variability of variable x in station i. To 
obtain a compound measure of year-to-year variability for station i I average sim over the 
twelve months. 
 
The reason to take weather variation for a long time is twofold: (i) the migration data covers 
both long-term and short-term migrants with the longest duration of migrants in the cities 
about 48 years. Therefore, the reasons to migrate may originate from historical natural shocks 
rather than the present ones and (ii) rainfall variation may closely relate with other bio-
geographic conditions such as land quality and terrain ruggedness. All of these can have both 
direct and indirect effects on agricultural incomes and living conditions or rural people that 
create incentives for migration.  
 
                                                          
4
On average, there are nearly 12 districts in one province. The area of each district ranges from 27.8 to 3677.4 
square kilometres and the mean is 660 square kilometres. For the period 1975–2006, the data is taken from 
Thomas et al. ‘Natural disasters and household welfare: evidence from Vietnam’, Policy Research Working 
Paper, 2010, World Bank. 
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To be even more cautious about the exogeneity, the working assumptions are set up in such 
a way as to make the IV estimates as reasonable and cautious as possible: (i) Rainfall 
variation in the rural regions is assumed to not affect any labor market conditions at the 
destination; (ii) Unobserved individual heterogeneity (e.g., ability, preferences, health 
conditions, reservation wage), is assumed to be uncorrelated with the intensity of natural 
disasters. This is important especially because natural disasters may lower the reservation 
wage of a potential migrant. Given the substantial income gaps between rural and urban 
Vietnam, however, even the lowest wage levels in cities are still attractive to villagers. This 
makes the reservation wage argument inapplicable in this setting (see also Munshi, 2003).  
 
Table 4 reports the results of the first-stage IV estimates. Because the distribution of the 
weather variation is highly left skewed, with a small number of observations taking large 
values, I report estimates using the natural log of the weather variation measure. All the 
coefficients have the expected sign. The further weather variation, the higher the number of 
urban callings. All weather variation coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
In the second stage, the estimated coefficients for social networks are significant and positive. 
The magnitude of the coefficient in the IV estimation does not change substantially if other 
controls are included, ranging from 0.072 to 0.089. The results in Column 4 of Table 5 show 
that the result is still significant when all other variables are controlled. The magnitude of the 
IV estimates is higher than those from the OLS estimates. One explanation for this is that the 
attenuation bias, resulting from measurement errors, leads OLS estimates to be biased towards 
zero, and IV results in an increase in the magnitude of the coefficient.  
 
The F-test for an excluded instrument is also reported. The F-statistics in Table 4 range from 
5.72 to 9.47, suggesting that for some specifications there may be a potential concern about 
weak instruments. If a proposed instrument is not strongly correlated with the endogenous 
variables then the instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) estimates may be 
somewhat biased toward ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (Bound, Jaeger & Baker, 
1995; Staiger & Stock, 1997).  For this reason I also use the LIML Fuller Instrumental 
variable estimation method that is a bias-corrected limited information maximum likelihood 
estimator and provides the most unbiased estimates for inference purposes when the 
instrument is potentially weak (Stock, Wright & Yogo, 2002). The regression provides similar 
estimates. 
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In addition, because the IV estimate mainly applies to the subgroup of individuals more 
affected by natural disasters, the IV estimate can be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment 
Effects (LATE) (Imbens & Angrist, 1994). If the IV estimate is to be interpreted as a class of 
LATE, we must raise the question about the mechanism that explains how natural disasters 
influence migration and why networks effects differ across individuals. One possible 
mechanism is that that less able people (in terms of earning ability at the destination) are more 
responsive to natural disasters since they have relatively lower ability to compensate for 
losses due to natural disasters. That is, people of lower earning ability are more likely to be 
pulled out from the rural regions by natural hazards. If this is the case, the IV estimate can be 
interpreted as a weighted average network effect and the weight for less able migrants is 
relatively higher. 
 
The IV results for the impacts of social network on willingness to run their own business by 
wage-earners are also consistent with prediction. In Table 7, all estimated coefficients for 
social network are significant and positive, indicating that increase in social network makes 
wage-earners to be more willing to run their own business. 
 
Sensitivity Tests 
 
My IV strategy rest on the assumptions that the weather variation does not affect demand 
labor at destination and migrant’s earning ability and preferences. The first assumption is 
likely to be satisfied. I have not found any literature that documents that weather variation 
may create a mass migration from rural regions that have big impacts on labor market 
condition in the cities over the last 30 years. However, the second assumption may be 
violated. Recent studies, such as (Durante, 2009; Dang, 2012; Cameron, 2011) shows that 
natural disasters may change individual behaviors. They find that people who live in more 
frequency of natural disasters and weather variation trust other people more. In addition, they 
seem more risk averse. If trustworthiness and risk attitudes correlate with migrant’s incomes 
then the IV estimates will be biased and inconsistent. Natural conditions also may affect 
health’s migrants. To test all of these possibilities, I control for several variables including 
individual trust, risk preferences and health conditions. The results show that the results are 
almost identical. 
 
Another way to test this likelihood is to estimate the reduced form relationship between 
weather variation and migrant’s incomes. The estimation results are reported in Table 8. 
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When I examine the reduced form, I find a strong positive and highly significant relationship 
between weather variation and change in migrant’s incomes. This correlation is consistent 
with the first-and-second stage IV estimates in Tables 4 and 5, individuals who migrate from 
more weather variation regions tend to create more social networks and this in turn help them 
find a better jobs and incomes.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite the proliferation of research seeking to identify the mechanisms and measure the 
magnitude of internal migration, little emphasis has been placed on probing the direct 
causal effects of migrant networks on labour market outcomes at the destination. This paper 
explores the causal effects of the size of migrant networks on income and employment 
dynamics among migrants in Vietnam. It complements recent research on the labour market 
effects of migrant networks in other developing economies.  
 
Controlling for the unobserved factors influencing migration decision, identification is 
achieved through instrumenting the network size by the intensity of weather variation 
occurring in the sending commune of the migrants. The empirical results show that the size 
of the migrant network significantly improves the wages of migrants and makes wage 
earners willing to run their own business. 
 
The results of this paper suggest that social networks help overcoming some of the frictions 
present in the labour market. On possible channel is that the social network helps to reduce 
the asymmetric information between the employer and the employee, therefore improving 
the job match. The results also show that although there is a stronger formalization of job 
search channels in developing countries, personal contacts will remain an important 
channel to obtain better paid jobs. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Log of change in current and 
first job incomes 560 0.586 0.958 -4.94 6.42 
Thought about running their 
own business 511 0.346 0.476 0 1 
Switching in job types 555 0.110 0.477 -1 1 
Years of schooling 546 9.656 2.953 0 12 
Age 560 29.673 8.282 16 66 
Age squared 560 948.973 588.115 256 4356 
Gender 560 0.689 0.463 0 1 
Minority 560 0.030 0.172 0 1 
Working in state sector 559 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Working in foreign sector 559 0.191 0.394 0 1 
Number of urban calling 485 11.526 20.818 0 270 
Duration of staying in the 
cities 558 7.050 5.232 0.167 35 
Trust 540 0.129 0.336 0 1 
Risk preferences 540 5.25 1.788 0 10 
Health condition 560 0.954 0.211 0 1 
 
Table 2. OLS Estimates. Relationship between number of urban callings and income 
dynamics 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Log of change in current and first job incomes 
            
Number of callings to urban 
people 0.003* 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** -0.010 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Years of schooling -0.009 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Age 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.083** 0.082** 0.075** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.089 -0.077 -0.071 -0.054 -0.054 
 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.098) (0.100) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -0.377*** -0.393*** -0.401*** -0.377*** -0.395*** 
 
(0.133) (0.134) (0.140) (0.140) (0.152) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.118 -0.114 -0.105 -0.113 -0.136 
 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) (0.116) 
Foreign ownership:=1; o/w:=0 0.124 0.135 0.135 0.115 0.135 
 
(0.136) (0.137) (0.139) (0.142) (0.139) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
  
0.017 0.016 0.006 
   
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) 
Switching from informal to 
formal job types 
   
0.107 0.088 
    
(0.094) (0.096) 
Number of urban calling X Less 
than 3 years staying in the cities 
    
0.019** 
     
(0.007) 
Number of urban calling X From 
3 to less than 5 years staying in 
the cities 
    
0.015 
     
(0.011) 
Number of urban calling X From 
5 to less than 8 years staying in 
the cities 
    
0.028** 
     
(0.012) 
Number of urban calling X From 
8 to less than 12 years staying 
in the cities 
    
0.023 
     
(0.014) 
Constant -0.994** -0.928* -0.584 -0.608 -0.417 
 
(0.478) (0.473) (0.544) (0.546) (0.515) 
      Observations 470 466 465 461 461 
R-squared 0.047 0.053 0.060 0.061 0.074 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 3. OLS Estimates. Relationship between number of urban callings and 
employment transition 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Wage earners want to run a business 
            
Number of callings to urban 
people 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.004* 0.006 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Years of schooling 0.098** 0.099** 0.130*** 0.103** 0.100** 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) 
Age 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age squared 0.039*** 0.025** 0.025* 0.020 0.021 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 0.148 0.155 -0.013 -0.003 -0.012 
 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.127) (0.129) (0.127) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.025 -0.039 -0.011 -0.041 -0.035 
 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Foreign ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.009 -0.015 -0.043 -0.056 -0.061 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.007 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Switching from informal to 
formal job types 
  
0.058 0.045 0.046 
   
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
Log of total income per month 
   
0.159*** 0.161*** 
    
(0.055) (0.055) 
Number of urban calling X Less 
than 3 years staying in the cities 
    
-0.004 
     
(0.006) 
Number of urban calling X From 
3 to less than 5 years staying in 
the cities 
    
-0.002 
     
(0.005) 
Number of urban calling X From 
5 to less than 8 years staying in 
the cities 
    
-0.004 
     
(0.006) 
Number of urban calling X From 
8 to less than 12 years staying 
in the cities 
    
-0.000 
     
(0.007) 
Constant -0.500** -0.274 -0.276 -1.416*** -1.450*** 
 
(0.196) (0.209) (0.230) (0.462) (0.469) 
      Observations 607 604 504 502 502 
R-squared 0.052 0.070 0.081 0.095 0.096 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
23 
 
 
Table 4. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban callings on income dynamics (First 
Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Number of callings to urban people 
         
Log of rainfall variation 7.630*** 6.825*** 6.078** 6.078** 
 
(2.479) (2.452) (2.537) (2.540) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.842 -0.678 -1.275 -1.264 
 
(1.144) (1.212) (1.284) (1.288) 
Age 0.652** 0.178 0.145 0.150 
 
(0.299) (0.327) (0.352) (0.348) 
Age squared -0.009** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 1.840 1.547 1.184 1.119 
 
(3.810) (3.477) (3.554) (3.484) 
Years of schooling 0.949*** 0.863*** 0.861*** 0.860*** 
 
(0.144) (0.146) (0.148) (0.148) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
0.548 0.915 0.987 
  
(1.971) (2.004) (2.005) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.567 -0.835 -0.767 
  
(1.230) (1.294) (1.295) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.288** 0.263** 0.265** 
  
(0.111) (0.125) (0.125) 
Level of risk preferences 
  
0.588* 0.594* 
   
(0.350) (0.352) 
Almost people can be trusted:=1 
  
1.905 1.928 
   
(1.529) (1.528) 
Health condition 
  
 -0.928 
   
 (2.236) 
Constant -55.309*** -42.789*** -40.463** -39.690** 
 
(15.633) (15.858) (16.284) (16.309) 
   
 
 Observations 467 465 447 447 
F-test for excluded instrument 9.47 9.06 5.74 5.72 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two 
sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
Table 5. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban callings on income dynamics 
(Second Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log of change in current and first job incomes 
         
Number of callings to urban people 0.072** 0.077** 0.089* 0.089* 
 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.034 -0.017 0.065 0.064 
 
(0.120) (0.128) (0.151) (0.151) 
Age 0.067 0.071* 0.068 0.067 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age squared -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -0.460 -0.488 -0.553 -0.543 
 
(0.287) (0.305) (0.361) (0.355) 
Years of schooling -0.077** -0.076** -0.095** -0.095** 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.289 -0.379 -0.390* 
  
(0.215) (0.232) (0.235) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.098 -0.167 -0.177 
  
(0.164) (0.163) (0.164) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
-0.005 0.013 0.012 
  
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
Level of risk preferences 
  
-0.039 -0.040 
   
(0.050) (0.050) 
Almost people can be trusted:=1 
  
0.007 0.004 
   
(0.202) (0.203) 
Health condition 
  
 0.133 
   
 (0.266) 
Constant -0.273 -0.299 0.011 -0.100 
 
(0.678) (0.730) (0.748) (0.772) 
   
 
 Observations 467 465 447 447 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a 
two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table 6. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban callings on employment transition 
(First Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Number of callings to urban people 
        
Years of schooling 0.775*** 0.651*** 0.678*** 
 
(0.123) (0.131) (0.133) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.569 -1.087 -1.078 
 
(0.979) (0.972) (0.970) 
Age 0.592** 0.263 0.254 
 
(0.259) (0.296) (0.297) 
Age squared -0.008** -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -2.424 -2.255 -2.397 
 
(2.172) (2.107) (2.133) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 0.882 0.829 0.965 
 
(1.814) (1.975) (1.977) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.762 -0.904 -0.916 
 
(0.961) (1.038) (1.039) 
Current job through social network:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.695 -0.711 
  
(0.930) (0.928) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.191** 0.197** 
  
(0.087) (0.087) 
Level of risk preferences 
 
0.238 0.227 
  
(0.252) (0.252) 
Almost people can be trusted:=1 
  
1.694 
   
(1.189) 
Log of rainfall variation 8.911*** 9.102*** 8.710*** 
 
(1.994) (2.100) (2.106) 
Constant -59.772*** -55.434*** -53.407*** 
 
(13.061) (13.716) (13.716) 
    Observations 607 568 568 
F-test for excluded instrument 19.98 17.11 17.11 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two 
sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 7. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban callings on employment transition 
(Second Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Wage-earners want to run a business 
        
Number of callings to urban people 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Years of schooling -0.022* -0.020 -0.017 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 0.125** 0.146** 0.144** 
 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057) 
Age 0.015 0.011 0.012 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 0.249* 0.225* 0.214 
 
(0.131) (0.132) (0.132) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.046 -0.083 -0.075 
 
(0.093) (0.096) (0.094) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 0.043 0.019 0.017 
 
(0.060) (0.064) (0.063) 
Current job through social network:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.006 -0.008 
  
(0.055) (0.054) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.006 0.007 
  
(0.006) (0.006) 
Level of risk preferences 
 
0.009 0.009 
  
(0.015) (0.014) 
Almost people can be trusted:=1 
  
0.081 
   
(0.085) 
Constant -0.243 -0.221 -0.238 
 
(0.278) (0.287) (0.283) 
    Observations 607 568 568 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
     
 
Table 8. Reduced form. Relationship between weather variation and migrant’s incomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log of change in current and first job incomes 
         
Log of rainfall variation 0.549** 0.526** 0.540** 0.540** 
 
(0.261) (0.250) (0.266) (0.266) 
Years of schooling -0.008 -0.009 -0.018 -0.018 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age 0.114*** 0.085** 0.081** 0.081** 
 
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.094 -0.070 -0.048 -0.049 
 
(0.091) (0.096) (0.094) (0.094) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -0.328*** -0.369*** -0.447*** -0.444*** 
 
(0.124) (0.128) (0.129) (0.130) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.246 -0.298* -0.302* 
  
(0.161) (0.153) (0.155) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.142 -0.242** -0.245** 
  
(0.139) (0.117) (0.119) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.018 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  
(0.021) (0.013) (0.013) 
Level of risk preferences 
  
0.013 0.013 
   
(0.025) (0.025) 
Almost people can be trusted:=1 
  
0.176 0.175 
   
(0.113) (0.114) 
Health condition 
  
 0.051 
   
 (0.168) 
Constant -4.252*** -3.596** -3.584** -3.627** 
 
(1.621) (1.476) (1.581) (1.600) 
   
 
 Observations 467 465 447 447 
R-squared 0.048 0.060 0.108 0.108 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
Clustered standard errors are in brackets.
Figure 1. Relationship between income dynamics and number of urban callings 
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Appendix    
 
A.1 Logistic regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Wage-earners want to run a business 
          
Number of callings to urban people 0.017** 0.014* 0.033* 0.024 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.021) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 0.500** 0.378* 0.371 0.531** 
 
(0.219) (0.227) (0.228) (0.249) 
Years of schooling 0.034 0.003 0.004 0.009 
 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age 0.206** 0.169* 0.182* 0.167* 
 
(0.103) (0.099) (0.101) (0.099) 
Age squared -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 0.716 0.795 0.742 -0.079 
 
(0.533) (0.543) (0.549) (0.680) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.174 -0.313 -0.260 -0.143 
 
(0.265) (0.274) (0.278) (0.299) 
Foreign ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.085 -0.143 -0.169 -0.297 
 
(0.254) (0.257) (0.260) (0.273) 
Duration of staying in the cities 0.055*** 0.041** 0.033 0.039* 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) 
Log of total income per month 
 
0.779*** 0.810*** 0.790*** 
  
(0.250) (0.256) (0.286) 
Switching from informal to formal job types 
   
0.249 
    
(0.229) 
Number of urban calling X Less than 3 years 
staying in the cities 
  
-0.009 0.005 
   
(0.027) (0.030) 
Number of urban calling X From 3 to less than 5 
years staying in the cities 
  
-0.022 -0.013 
   
(0.025) (0.028) 
Number of urban calling X From 5 to less than 8 
years staying in the cities 
  
-0.021 -0.017 
   
(0.020) (0.023) 
Number of urban calling X From 8 to less than 
12 years staying in the cities 
  
-0.028 -0.017 
   
(0.020) (0.024) 
Constant -4.89*** 
-
10.32*** 
-
10.738*** 
-
10.397*** 
 
(1.603) (2.368) (2.446) (2.635) 
     Observations 605 601 601 503 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a 
two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets.  
 
